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THE SPECIAL SCIENCE DILEMMA ANDHOW
CULTURE SOLVES IT
Marion Godman
I argue that there is a tension between the claim that at least some kinds in the
special sciences are multiply realized and the claim that the reason why kinds
are prized by science is that they enter into a variety of different empirical
generalizations. Nevertheless, I show that this tension ceases in the case of
‘cultural homologues’—such as specific ideologies, religions, and folk wisdom.
I argue that the instances of such special science kinds do have several
projectable properties in common due to their shared history of reproduction,
and that the social learning involved means that we should also expect these
kinds to be multiply realized.
Keywords: multiple realization, special sciences, natural kinds, multiple proj-
ectability, homology thinking, cultural evolution
1. Introduction: A Dilemma for the Special Science Model
This is where many of us are at: the universe is physical and all that exists is
ultimately made out of physical stuff. If physicalism seems to leave us with a
rather drab ontology, then tough luck! Many physicalists do, however, con-
tinue to seek solace in the possibility that there is not just physics, but there
are also special sciences that have kinds that are multiply realized [Fodor
1974]. Surely, non-reductive physicalists will insist, not all biological, psy-
chological, and social kinds employed in empirical investigations and gener-
alizations are reducible to physical kinds.1 The ongoing appeal of multiple
realization is then about squaring physicalism or materialism with some jus-
tification for there being special sciences (from now on, often abbreviated as
‘SS’). While multiple realization requires that some physical state or kind P1
realizes a given special science kind SS1 (such that any system containing P1
will necessarily also contain SS1), it also holds that SS1 is not type-reducible
to an underlying physical kind. In other words, a disjunction of different
physical kinds, (P1 _ P2 _ P3 _ . . . _ Pn), can realize SS1.2
1 Although Fodor never offers an outright definition of the ‘special sciences’, he tends to use the term descrip-
tively to denote all sciences other than physics, with psychology as his paradigm special science (see, e.g.,
[1974: 97]). I stick to a descriptive use of ‘special sciences’ but mainly address the issue of multiple realization
in the life, human, and social sciences (thereby not addressing the issue for the ‘non-living’ natural sciences,
such as chemistry). It is sometimes tempting to think that Fodor simply uses ‘special sciences’ to refer to those
sciences whose laws and kinds are multiply realized. This definition would, however, be unfortunate, as this is
the substantial position that Fodor wishes to defend and hence not something that he should want to build
into the definition of the term.
2 The way to cash out the relationship of variable realization between the micro-level physical states or kinds
and the SS kind has been described in various terms, such as identity, token identity, and supervenience. An
anonymous referee has also suggested that it might be sufficient for a non-reductive physicalist to maintain
that macro-level properties are merely correlated with disjunctions of lower-order physical properties.
Although I doubt that correlation is sufficient here, there is no need for me to engage in the particulars of
these debates, so I merely stick throughout with a neutral concept of realization.
 2014 The Author(s). Published by Taylor & Francis.
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License http://
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Still, for putative SS kinds like, for example, pain, eyes, and Buddhism
(about which more will be said later) to be worthy objects of scientific
enquiry, the question of multiple realization seems less significant. More
important for science is that the kinds should exhibit some macro-level sta-
ble properties that allow us to use make legitimate projections and general-
izations over the kind’s instances. But why think that the different physical
bases of such kinds could end up producing such stabilities? For kinds to be
projectable, there must be at least some stable properties amongst, say,
instances of eyes, or individuals with pain. If the apparent stability does not
have as a base a common physical kind, what’s to stop us from thinking the
apparent stability is merely illusory? This raises an important dilemma for
the non-reductive physicalist about the grounds for the apparent projectabil-
ity of multiply realized kinds.3 The aim of this paper is to describe and refine
the dilemma, and then to offer a novel response in terms of cultural homo-
logues. In brief, I will argue that when cultural creatures stably reproduce
information and content, this not only permits, but also encourages,
multiple physical realizations of the same cultural kind.
The dilemma with which we will be concerned has been raised in slightly
different ways by Jaegwon Kim [1992], Ned Block [1997], and David Papi-
neau [2009, 2010].4 Yet they all press the point about whether a putative
multiply realized kind, like pain, can truly also be projectable. The dilemma
can be stated as follows:
Projectability Dilemma
(1) At least some SS kinds (e.g. pain) are both (a) projectable and (b)
multiply realized.
(2) Kinds are projectable only if each is realized by a single physical
kind.
(3) Kinds are multiply realized only if each kind is realized by multiple
diverse physical kinds, i.e. P1, P2, P3, . . ., Pn.
Claims 13 thus form an inconsistent set of propositions. Since the non-
reductive physicalist wants to maintain (1), she cannot also hold on to both
(2) and (3); hence the dilemma—she has to abandon one of the two. Aban-
doning (3) is clearly not an option for the non-reductive physicalist. It is (2)
that she must attempt to tackle. But what is the sense of winning the irreduc-
ibility for the special sciences, if it is at the cost of unsupported claims of
projectability? Thus, (2) can only be rejected if the projectability of an SS
kind can be explained in some way that does not depend on an SS kind being
realized by a uniform physical kind or mechanism.
3 Strictly speaking ‘projectable’ should be used to predicate linguistic items; still, I hope that I will be will for-
given for following common usage in using ‘projectable’ not only to predicate terms and predicates but also
to predicate properties and kinds.
4 There are of course other famous dilemmas targeting the possibility of multiple realization in the special sci-
ences, including an influential one due to Lawrence Shapiro [2000] (see also Zangwill [1992]; Shapiro and
Polger [2012]). This latter dilemma is, however, mainly concerned with the putative individuation rather than
with the projectability of multiply realized kinds; so it is at least in part distinct from the dilemma here and
although I believe my response in section 4 can also be applied to this dilemma, it probably deserves a
different treatment.
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Before we proceed to the responses to the dilemma, I should say some-
thing about the scope of multiple realization that is at issue. Fodor’s original
model of Science (with a capital ‘S’) is arguably one where multiple realiza-
tion is both pervasive in and distinctive of the different special sciences.5
However, in more recent work on the topic a weaker version of the multiple
realization seems to be addressed: namely, whether multiple realization is at
least empirically possible and plausible for some kinds in the special sciences,
thus not explicitly ruling out local reductions (see, for example, Richardson
[2008]). It is this latter weaker thesis that existing responses to the dilemma
and my own attempt to salvage.
The plan for the paper is this. Section 2 turns to the rejoinder that Ned
Block and David Papineau themselves offer to the dilemma: namely, that a
variety of different physical bases can all be selected for performing the
same function. They believe that selection processes, natural or cultural, can
explain the relevant stabilities and projectability exhibited by SS predicates.
I then argue that this solution is ultimately unsatisfactory, which in turn
prompts a refinement of the standard dilemma so that it is concerned with
multiple rather than single projectability (section 3). The final section offers
a response to the revised version of the dilemma (section 4). I argue that we
should expect cultural homologues, such as specific ideologies, folk wisdom,
and traditions to be both multiply projectable and multiply realized due to
their instances being reproduced by means of social learning.
2. A Selection-Based Solution
Block and Papineau present a solution to the dilemma where the projectabil-
ity (and multiple realization) of SS predicates is explained by appealing to
certain selection-based processes or laws in the natural and social world.
Block [1997] suggests that natural selection will be largely indifferent to the
way in which beneficial results are achieved: if a particular effect or function
is important enough for the fitness of the individual, natural selection will
even ensure that there are several different physical realizers for achieving
the effect. In a similar vein, Papineau [2009, 2010] suggests that cultural
selection often guarantees that there are different ways for achieving certain
cultural and social ends that are particularly important for groups and indi-
viduals (see also Kincaid [1990]). In other words, we have good reason to
expect that neither nature nor culture is particularly discriminating when it
comes to selecting the physical kinds required to perform a certain function.
And, what’s more, because these different instances have all been selected to
perform a particular function, this guarantees their entering into specific
selection-based laws or lawlike generalizations.
5 Fodor himself famously argues in response that psychological laws and other SS laws are best understood as
holding only ceteris paribus—with exceptions [1974, 1997]. But while it is of course true that ceteris paribus
laws display a different pattern of regularity and stability than those states that are governed by, let’s sup-
pose, exceptionless physical laws, this simply postpones the problem. If ceteris paribus laws are truly laws—
or at least lawlike, and not just accidental generalizations—there must still be some reason for trusting them
to begin with [Millikan 1999; Papineau 2009]. And if there is no non-reductive explanation available for this
non-accidentality, critics can always counter that the confidence we place in SS ceteris paribus laws is either
unfounded or ultimately explained by underlying physical laws.
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So it would seem that we can indeed have it both ways: on the one hand,
selection processes can bring about SS kinds that are genuinely multiply
realized; on the other, the very same multiply realized kinds are projectable
in virtue of supporting a particular generalization concerning their shared
selected function. Consider the paradigmatic SS predicate ‘pain’—allegedly
multiply realized and referring to an Octopus state M1, a human neural state
N1, a human neural state N2, and so on. Papineau suggests that we can make
sense of the predicate as denoting a naturally selected cross-species pain
mechanism [2010: 186]:
It is widely supposed that pain is multiply physically realized across
different life forms, yet nevertheless enters into laws mediating causes
and effects, such as the law that bodily damage gives rise to pain and
the law that pain in turn leads to avoidance of the source of the
damage.
So, accepting Papineau’s thesis that ‘pain’ is understood to refer to a cross-
species pain mechanism—Pain1—that enters into two selection-based and
closely associated laws does give us a case of multiple realization. Crucially,
any such selection-based predicate is projectable in a way that does not
depend on uniform physical realizations. The stabilities amongst instances
of Pain1 are just manifestations of common selective pressures operating in
different contexts, rather than of the same physical mechanism. In one
clean stroke, the appeal to selection looks to explain both multiple realiza-
tion and why SS predicates can be projectable without being reducible to
physical kinds.
Regrettably, there is good reason to restrain one’s enthusiasm regarding
the selection-based account of multiple realization. The projectability of
these selection-based predicates is precisely limited to the inferences concern-
ing the selected function. After all, for something to count as an instance of
Pain1, the item in question merely has to exhibit a certain selected function.
This leaves plenty of room for variability: a variety of states of different spe-
cies and possible intelligent machines are likely to qualify as Pain1, since it
merely has to conform to a certain functionally specified role. At the same
time, the very permissiveness in terms of how an item is allowed to perform
a function suggests that there will not be many commonalities other than
those that directly pertain to the selected function amongst those instances
picked out by the predicate. Some non-functional resemblances amongst
instances of selection-based kinds may of course exist, but this would be
merely accidental. In other words, we are not licensed to assume that instan-
ces of Pain1 support any generalizations above and beyond those that are
necessary for them to fulfil their functional role.
The upshot is that selection-based predicates support only one-off gener-
alizations or a very impoverished set of them. Mark Couch has made a simi-
lar point in his detailed review of the possible convergent evolution with
respect to Eye1, understood as a multiply realized selection-based property
[2005: 1048]:
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I have said that the structures can be classified as ‘light receptors’ if we
need a way to group them together. But the problem with this is it is
hardly informative to be told that the eyes all function to respond to
light. Researchers in vision science are concerned to discover more
interesting empirical generalizations than this. Their interest is with
finding generalizations that can be used to explain a broad range of
facts about the structures. The difficulty is that there is little more in
common among the structures to be the basis of such generalizations.
Given the differences that are present, there are only a limited number
of generalizations about the eyes that hold across all the structures.
Couch’s point here is that, once we have classified items purely according to
their selected function, there will be little else of interest for scientists to dis-
cover or uncover in terms of further similarities amongst instances of Eye1.
It follows that there will also be very few—and unsurprising—generaliza-
tions associated with other SS kinds that are picked out by selection-based
predicates alone.
3. The Real Dilemma
I take there to be a positive upshot in these limitations in the selection-based
solution, which is that it highlights the importance of a solution targeting
items that are held in esteem by the special sciences. After all, it is not clear
why we should be interested in defending the non-reducibility or autonomy
of just any projectable predicate. Now, a clue to what predicates are prized
by science lies in the diagnosis of why the selection-based predicates are dis-
appointing: they support merely single or one-off generalizations associated
with a selected function. Predicates esteemed by science tend to be project-
able in several respects: that is, able to support a variety of empirical general-
izations. One of the first to pick up on this crucial point was John Stuart
Mill, who insisted that what I will call ‘multiple projectability’ was the hall-
mark of natural kinds—or simply, ‘Kinds’, as Mill called them [1976 (1843):
7034]:
By a Kind, it will be remembered, we mean one of those classes which
are distinguished from all others not by one or a few definite proper-
ties, but by an unknown multitude of them . . . [T]he class horse is a
Kind, because the things which agree in possessing the characters by
which we recognise a horse, agree in a great number of properties, as
we know, and, it cannot be doubted, in a great many more than we
know. White horse, therefore, is not a Kind; because horses which
agree in whiteness do not agree in anything else, except the qualities
that are common for all horses, and whatever may be the causes or
effects of that particular colour.
Following Mill, many have agreed that a central condition for classes to
be kinds—or at the very least to form kinds who have their home in scientific
The Special Science Dilemma and How Culture Solves It 495
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investigation and inference—is that their members or instances must have a
variety of projectable properties in common with one another (see,
for example, Gelman and Markman [1987]; Boyd [1991, 1999]; Griffiths
[1999]; Millikan [2000]; Machery [2009]).6
The reason for thinking that this multiple projectability displayed by
kinds is of a comparatively superior value for science than mere projectabil-
ity (of, say, the just-mentioned selection-based categories) is not so much the
quantity of generalizations itself but the fact that there are further valid gen-
eralizations over the kind’s instances than those that are immediately obvi-
ous to us. Likewise, the problem with selection-based predicates is not really
that they tend to support only few generalizations across their instances, but
that we are not licensed to predict or project that they will share any other
similarities with one another. The ability to predict further properties
amongst instances, without having to first check whether the properties are
in fact there, is on the other hand an important epistemic corollary of there
being natural kinds. If we know that A, B, and C are members of the same
kind, and that A has properties x, y, z, etc., we can, at least ceteris paribus,
assume that B and C will have further instances of those same properties.
The assumption here is that the properties of genuine kinds come together
for some non-accidental reason, which in turn licenses further projections
and scientific investigation. In fact, Ruth Millikan has on the basis of this
argued that real kinds are a major source of all non-accidental learning
[2000].
I hasten to add that the open-ended fecundity is entirely consistent with
kinds varying across both dimensions of the reliability of the generalizations
and of the range of inferences supported. Not all kinds are born equal in
terms of inferential reliability or fecundity. And, as will become important
later on, at least in the special sciences kinds also vary in terms of scope:
namely, the distribution or range of ‘systems’ to which the kinds and rele-
vant generalizations apply [Griffiths 1999; Raerinne 2013]. Yet, despite var-
iations across these dimensions, I contend that multiple projectability or
open-ended fecundity is a unifying feature of (natural) kinds in different spe-
cial sciences. It is this feature that distinguishes kinds from mere projectable
properties, thereby explaining their distinctive role in underwriting scientific
investigation, generalization, and prediction.
Interestingly, the criteria for SS kinds to display open-ended fecundity
rules out another recent defence of multiple realization in the special scien-
ces. Daniel Weiskopf has suggested that an SS predicate might in some sense
refer to a ‘functional kind’ that supports functional generalizations in virtue
of playing a role in a range of well-confirmed models. But, as Weiskopf him-
self points out, whatever capacities and behaviour are present here must be
‘necessary effects’ for the model(s) to hold true [2011: 24654]. Hence,
although such models may in some sense ground functional categories in a
way that allows them to enter into multiple lawlike statements, such
6Papineau also recognizes this limitation in the use of selection-based SS predicates: ‘However, selection-
based patterns might be argued to fall short of the requirements for a genuine “science” in a different respect.
Paradigm examples of natural kinds enter into lots of laws, not just single ones’ [2010: 188]. Nevertheless, he
appears not to take this as being a decisive problem for the selection-based response to the dilemma.
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statements will then have to be tied to the model deductively. Whatever the
virtues of such ‘kinds’, they are not equivalent to the kinds in question here,
since any lawlike generalizations supported by multiply projectable kinds
are not licensed by models or conventions. However, the question of what
grounds SS kinds do have is precisely what is queried by the dilemma and
what I will address more positively in the next section.
We now finally have a better appreciation for what is wrong with the
selection-based approach to solving the dilemma. The selection-based solu-
tion in fact fails to save the possibility of multiply realized SS kinds. Since a
central characteristic of kinds is that they support multiple empirical gener-
alizations, it follows that those instances that are jointly projectable solely in
relation to their selected function will not be kinds at all!7 But it should now
also be clear that the problem lies not merely with the selection-based solu-
tion, but instead with the dilemma itself (or at least with how it is typically
presented in the literature). While it is still necessary to explain the alleged
projectability, it is not sufficient. For the dilemma to concern genuinely use-
ful multiple realization in the special sciences, the dilemma must address the
open-ended fecundity (which allow us to investigate particular instances in
view of making legitimate extrapolations to other instances of the same
kind). It can be stated as follows:
The Real Multiple Projectability Dilemma
(1) At least some SS kinds are both (a) multiply projectable and
(b) multiply realized.
(2) Kinds are multiply projectable only if each is realized by a single
physical kind.
(3) Kinds are multiply realized only if each kind is realized by multiple
diverse physical kinds, i.e. P1, P2, P3, . . ., Pn.
4. How Culture Solves the Real Dilemma
4.1 Homology Thinking and Multiple Projectability
The last section concluded that, in order to dissolve the real dilemma in
favour of non-reductive physicalism, it is multiple projectability that must be
explained. And, as before, it must be explained without reference to an
underlying physical kind or stable physical mechanism. The reason why the
appeal to selection-based proposal would be inadequate for solving this lat-
ter dilemma is then that mere selected function amongst instances typically
rules out multiple projectability. Yet, while selection alone does not warrant
expectations of multiple projectability, it is important to recognize that cer-
tain stable SS kinds pressures in the environment can and often do contrib-
ute to the projectability of some biological kinds whose members already
share common ancestry. However, as I will try to demonstrate in this section,
7 Fodor in his original special science paper suggests that we should indeed understand an SS predicate as a
predicate denoting natural kinds: ‘roughly, the natural kind predicates of a science are the ones whose terms
are the bound variables in its proper laws’ [1974: 102]. I add only that an important stress should be on the
natural kind term being a bound variable in a variety of SS laws or non-accidental generalizations.
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in such cases the multiple projectability in question is ultimately explained
precisely with reference to the shared history of the instances (and it follows
that shared selected function is neither sufficient nor necessary for multiple
projectability).
To anticipate, it is for this reason that Marc Ereshefsky has argued that
the case of homologues and what he calls ‘homology thinking’ (echoing
Ernst Mayr’s phrase, ‘population thinking’), can be used to make a plausible
empirical case for multiple realization in biology [2007, 2012]. I am not per-
suaded. I will argue that the particular developmental mechanism responsi-
ble for realizing instances of a biological homologue needs to be more or less
stable across generations if those instances are also to be jointly multiply
projectable in terms of physiological, morphological, and behavioural fea-
tures. So, for multiple projectability for biological homologous to be
achieved, one must assume at least a significant overlap between the physical
kinds responsible for realization. In the next section, I will argue that it is
instead in the domain of culture that we should expect some (cultural)
homologues to be realized by various physical kinds.
But, first of all, how does a shared historical lineage license assumptions of
multiple shared properties amongst instances of a SS kind? Let’s begin by
observing the contrast that biologists adopt between characters that are
homologous and characters that are analogous. A typical analogue is the
wing, which occurs in a variety of animals such as birds, bats, and insects. It
is an analogue, since it has been selected to serve the same function in dis-
tinct species. But just as in the case of the predicates that enter into selec-
tion-based laws (e.g. Pain1 and Eye1), the different instances of the
analogue—wing—are unlikely to have any other characteristics in common
apart from their selected function and perhaps their conforming to some
design constraints. This is due to the wings evolving independently of one
another; they lack a common ancestor and a shared history. Homologues,
by contrast, have a phylogenetic continuity with a common ancestor. Just
like analogues, homologues can of course occur in different individual
organisms of either the same or different species; but here it is the historical
continuity with a common ancestor that is shared between instances of a
homologue that licenses an expectation of projectable similarity amongst
them.
Again we may take wings as a case in point. To be sure, the wings of
moths and eagles have evolved quite independently of each other, since their
last common ancestor did not have wings; but it is also true that each spe-
cies’ wing represents a homologue. And this expectation is borne out in the
projections we make about one moth’s wings that are likely to be true for
other moths (and some for other insects) but likely to be false for the wings
of a bald eagle—and vice versa. A character that is homologous supports a
range of different empirical generalizations. This is also one of the reasons
cited for homologues—in contrast to analogues—being of central impor-
tance to biologists [Wagner 1996; Brigandt and Griffiths 2007; Ereshefsky
2012].
Now the multiple projectability of a homologue does not come about sim-
ply through some pre-established plan or inertia. For a start, some stable
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genetic mechanisms must be in place to buffer the development of new
instances. Together with some stable ontogenetic or developmental mecha-
nisms, they in a sense reproduce new instances of the same homologue—or
new members of the historical kind—by ensuring that these share properties
with their ancestors. And, as mentioned previously, recurrent pressures in
the environment can also contribute to the stability of many homologues
(e.g. by weeding out deleterious mutations)—which is why some homo-
logues are also capable of entering into more specific functional generaliza-
tions. All the same, the reference to any single genetic or developmental
mechanism does not explain the multiple projectability of a particular homo-
logue, since none of these features on its own guarantees the range of induc-
tive similarity that is found across instances (or generations) of a particular
homologue.
Marc Ereshefsky [2012] has argued that one of the virtues of ‘homology
thinking’ is precisely that it provides a better explanation for why a particu-
lar character has a particular set of properties than does, for example, a
shared selected function or a particular developmental mechanism. The his-
toricity of the explanation is truly ‘path-dependent’: it cites not merely the
initial condition or a common ancestor, but multiple factors along the his-
torical path or lineage (Ereshefsky [2012]; see also Matthen [2007]). The
shorthand for the historical explanation is the historical path itself. Indulg-
ing in some Darwinian metaphysics of natural kinds, we might say that the
historical lineage of the homologue or kind is its ‘essential nature’, in the
sense that it is a particular relation or relational property that an instance
could not lose without ceasing to be a member of the kind [Millikan 1984:
265; Okasha 2002]. The main point here, though, is that the proper explana-
tion for any inductive fecundity displayed by a homologue is the shared his-
tory of the instances; and, conversely, knowledge of a shared lineage
amongst instances of a kind licenses expectations of inductive fecundity.
Amongst the virtues of homology thinking, Ereshefsky singles out an
explanation of multiple realization. He claims that it ‘provides a well-
founded empirical account of why multiple realization occurs in biology: as
the phylogenetic history of a homologue unfolds, the underlying factors that
cause that homologue are substituted’ [2012: 395]. Ereshefsky argues that
substitution of the proximate developmental mechanisms might lead to dif-
ferent instances of the same homologous character having distinct realiza-
tions. He cites Brian Hall’s [2003] example of how ontogenetic processes
have been replaced in the case of tetrapod digits. The ancestral developmen-
tal mechanism for the interdigital spaces is genetically programmed cell
death (apoptosis) that removes connective tissue from between the digit pri-
morida, leaving interdigital spaces. In amphibian urodeles, however, there is
a derived developmental mechanism for the interdigital spaces: differential
growth of digits. Ereshefsky takes this possible replacement of genetic and
ontogenetic mechanisms in distinct yet homologous lineages to suggest an
empirical basis for multiple realization.
Alas, I believe that his case falls short of providing a case for a multiply
realized kind. In the biological domain, the multiple projectability of certain
homologues typically concerns structural, morphological, generative, and
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behavioural properties. These projectable features do depend on some over-
lapping stability in terms of proximate physical mechanisms. Although sub-
stitutions in genetic and developmental mechanisms can certainly occur,
such substitution undercuts the possibility of instances in that lineage having
some multiple of those structural, generative, and behavioural properties in
common. In other words, while extensive substitution in the genetic and
ontogenetic processes underlying homologous traits may be possible, this
typically does not preserve the rich amount of projectable features. So, while
we should probably agree that the tetrapod limbs of amphibian urodeles
and ducks are homologous (rather than a case of evolutionary novelty), the
variation in the responsible developmental mechanisms has implied that
they do not share vary many generative, morphological, and behavioural
features with one another. For biological homologues, then, developmental
replacement tends to be at the expense of an open-ended fecundity.8
A corollary of these concerns is, of course, that multiple projectability of
biological homologues is not necessarily preserved for long stretches of evo-
lutionary time as substitution and replacement does indeed occur in the
developmental mechanisms. It is therefore worth stressing that my claim has
only been that the historical-reproductive continuity between instances
prima facie justifies the expectation of there being unexplored similarities
amongst instances of the same homologue. Yet, as we have just seen, this
justification is weakened when we know that the relevant developmental
mechanism might be entirely substituted—as in the changes to tetrapod dig-
its that occurred over long stretches of the phylogenetic tree.
4.2 The Multiple Realization of Cultural Homologues
The reservations I submitted against applying the multiple realization thesis
to biological homologues was also meant to anticipate the possibility that
variation in the physical means of realization need not undercut the multiple
projectability of a different class of homologues: those transmitted by cul-
ture.9 In this section, I will argue that the historical-reproductive lineages
that underpin the instances of certain cultural kinds do license assumptions
of multiple shared features and that, due to the flexibility provided by both
social learning and culture, the content is encouraged to be realized in vari-
ous physical forms.
Let me first be clear on the cultural kinds I have in mind, especially as I am
not the first to propose that certain kinds in the human and social sciences
can be modelled on homologues and other ‘historical kinds’ in biology (see
Hull [1988]; Millikan [1999, 2000: 1823]; Ereshefsky [2007]; Bach [2012]).10
The cultural-historical kinds or ‘cultural homologues’ that my argument
8 Indeed, this seems to be why some biologists think that phylogeny and a stable developmental module go
hand in hand when defining a homology [Wagner and Misof 1993].
9 It should be noted that even if one is not convinced by my reservations against multiply realized biological
kinds in the last section, one can still see the project that I engage with in this sectionof explaining how cul-
tural kinds are multiply realized—as an independent and hitherto unrecognized pathway to variable realiza-
tion. I thank an anonymous reviewer for making this alternative salient to me.
10 Although Richard Boyd [1999] has some reservations against grounding biological species in an historical-
reproductive lineage, he also admits that an historical account might apply to some other kinds.
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concerns here are those that contain systematically arranged information or
content, such as certain kinds of ideologies, folk wisdom, and other cultural
traditions. The information or content in question is typically a combination
of factual knowledge about the world and prescriptive or practical know-
how, like social democracy, Sikhism, the folk wisdom of the Sami, and so on.
I contend that anthropologists and other social scientists take an interest
in such cultural items because they expect them to be able to afford at least
some stable projections within and across certain human populations in
time. These projections concern not only the content of such knowledge sys-
tems itself, but also predictions about the behaviour and social norms of
individuals who adhere to the relevant content. These systems of knowledge
can thus at least prima facie be treated as kinds, in the sense of licensing
expectations of inductive fecundity. Moreover, the fact that the relevant gen-
eralizations occur mostly across different time-slices (or temporal instances)
suggests that we assume that there is some relevant degree of historical con-
tinuity amongst the instances.
The claim, then, is that the reason why social scientists typically get away
with this is that they are indeed dealing with cultural homologues.11 The
instances of such cultural knowledge are jointly multiply projectable, not
due to a particular functional role (nor does it depend on a uniform physical
mechanism—or so I will argue), but because of their shared historical line-
age of reproduction. Just as in the case of biological homologues, the histori-
cal-reproductive lineage is explanatory in the sense that it abbreviates
multiple factors along a particular spatial-temporal trajectory. Amongst the
features of the historical path there will be some relevant reproductive mech-
anisms and also external pressures that stabilize the projectable properties of
cultural kind over time. Yet an important difference between biological
homologues and cultural ones is of course that in the latter case the type of
reproductive mechanisms requisite for generating an historical lineage of
cultural knowledge is not going to be mainly genetic or even ontogenetic.
Instead, the reproduction in question is generally explored under the head-
ing of ‘social learning’: e.g. teaching, imitation, symbolic learning between
subjects, or simply observation of others’ behaviour [Richerson and Boyd
2005; Mesoudi 2011; Heyes 2012].
Using a model of reproduction sketched by Peter Godfrey-Smith [2009:
6987], we might take an historical-reproductive lineage amongst instances
of a cultural homologue to be created by (1) an instance of a certain kind (in
this case, an instance of cultural knowledge) standing as a model or tem-
plate, and (2) some mechanisms (in this case, for the most part, social learn-
ing) reproducing the features of the model, thereby also (3) producing a new
instance of the kind. Social learning thereby has a parallel role to reproduc-
tion by means of genetic and developmental mechanisms, in that it facilitates
11 The social sciences are of course often interested in precisely the change and variation amongst different
temporal instances of cultural knowledge; but to explore such differences means presupposing some underly-
ing notion of historical continuity in order to get a comparison off the ground in the first place.
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an historical lineage amongst the instances of a kind, ensuring that there is
also shared projectable content.12
It is these cultural homologues whose instances are reproduced by means
of social learning that are genuinely multiply physically realized. Recall that
the reason why we should not expect multiple realization in the case of bio-
logical homologues is that any variation in the developmental mechanisms
that are responsible for stabilizing an homologous trait comes at the expense
of overall similarities. Not so in the case cultural homologues. The same
trade-off between, on the one hand, variation in underlying mechanism for
realization and, on the other, the inductive richness is not present here. This
is because social learning is capable of reproducing the relevant cultural
information in question in several flexible and interchangeable ways.
Although cultural information in question is typically expressed in terms
like ‘belief systems’ or ‘oral traditions’, the truth is that it does not really
matter in which physical manner such knowledge is realized. In fact, social
learning exploits the possibility that cultural information is the kind of infor-
mation that can be expressed by a variety of means like artefacts, skills, ges-
tures, texts, beliefs, and linguistic utterances. This variation of physical
realization occurs without sacrificing precisely the projectable content that
interests social scientists and others.
Before developing the argument for multiple realization of cultural homo-
logues in slightly more detail, let’s make the idea a bit more concrete by
means of an example of a specific cultural homology. In communities in the
northeast of Brazil, one finds a collection of folk syndromes, including
blood-boiling bruises, nervos (nerves), sustois (shock sickness), mal olhado
(evil eye), and peito aberto (open chest). Linda-Anne Rebhun, an anthropol-
ogist who studied this interrelated group of syndromes, argues that these
syndromes all come about due to culture-specific knowledge about the dis-
tinctive physical and psychological features of each illness and their social
and emotional causes [1994: 375]:
The syndromes connote different things about the sufferer. Sustois is a
state of emotional vulnerability caused by one or more shocking
events. It can lead to nervos, or the frazzling of a person’s ability to
remain calm through repeated worry, grief, anger, and sadness. Peito
aberto occurs when a woman’s heart expands to encompass all those
for whom she feels compassion and, combined with the seething of her
12 Two worries one might have about the analogy between biological and cultural homologues: first, it is
going to be much less obvious how we should count instances or members of the same kind of cultural knowl-
edge than in the case of biological homologues (or organisms that are members of a species); and second, the
multiple projectability of such cultural knowledge will be (far) less than perfectly projectable, as in human
culture there is always room for plenty of ‘mutations’. Yet the growing amount of literature on cultural
evolution is devoted precisely to exploring how cultural traits due to social learning are reproduced despite
the threat of being washed out by individual learning and innovation [Mesoudi 2011]. Thus, the issue is not
one of whether culture can be reliably retained, but instead one of how best to explain its being reliably
retained. These concerns thus represent not just general, but also tractable, worries about cultural evolution:
e.g. that cultural reproduction lacks a clear bottleneck and is of less high fidelity than genetic reproduction.
Those concerns also matter less for the purposes of this paper, as the argument here does not depend on
cultural evolution mirroring biological evolution in every sense.
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own suppressed anger, pushes open her chest, allowing negative influ-
ences to enter. Evil eye is caused by the envy and anger of others, vic-
timizing the sufferer.
The culture of this region thus stipulates—perhaps correctly—that there is
a strong connection between the experience of negative emotions and illnesses
of various kinds: the emotions or their suppression have a sort of sickening
power (engolir sapos or ‘swallowing frogs’). The fact that it is almost solely
women who experience the syndromes in this region is also predicted by the
culture’s gender-specific prescriptions for emotional appraisal and suppres-
sion. For example, the practical know-how stipulates that it is much more
acceptable for women to contain and suppress negative emotions than it is to
express them directly; however, if women are unsuccessful with suppressing
their emotions, there is also a recognition, and often even approval, of the ail-
ments in question [1994: 3634]. The cultural homologue of the region thus
offers stable projectable information about the nature of the syndromes as
well as further projectable properties: for example, what the emotional trig-
gers are, the means of healing, and the treatment that is recommended.
The hypothesis, then, is that social learning can flexibly employ various
means for realizing the projectable cultural content in question. In this
example, for instance, we see it realized in verbal representations, either by
the syndromes being referred to in passing or elaborated in discussions and
stories; by being embodied in the gestures and behaviour of individuals who
take themselves to be a victim of a syndrome or have been diagnosed as
such; and finally in the instruments and skills of expert faith healers.
To be clear, this account is compatible with there being considerable
social and psychological constraints (cognitive and motivational) for social
learning itself. Indeed, most people working on cultural evolution assume
that there are; they just disagree about the nature of these constraints and
hence about the key psychological and social means for stabilizing cultural
homologues over time (see, for example, Sperber [1996]; Richerson and
Boyd [2005]; Sterelny [2006]; Heyes [2012]). The key point here is rather
that, no matter what the psychological and social constraints for social
learning are, none of them also constrain the physical realization of the prod-
uct: i.e. the physical manifestation of the cultural information. What has
been physically modelled in an utterance can still be reproduced and
expressed in the skills, beliefs, artefacts, and so on. Thus, neither the social
learning mechanisms of observation, imitation, and teaching, nor its psycho-
logical components typically place constraints on the content being repro-
duced in the same physical manner as it has been modelled.
Indeed, considering the abundance of physical resources that social learn-
ing and human culture has at its disposal in reproducing content, it would
be strange if it did not also use multiple physical means. Take the informa-
tion concerning the diagnosis of Peito aberto (performed by measuring a
string twice against the patient’s forearm and then looping it around the
chest to see whether it closes securely around the chest—it never does
[Rebhun 1994: 369]). It might originally be conveyed by a verbal self-report
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and then be transmitted in the narratives of the next generation, to then be
instantiated in the medical practice and instruments—or any other combina-
tion of the above. In fact, in order to understand, explain, and perhaps also
treat the syndromes that result in part from such knowledge, it makes sense
for anthropologists, psychiatrists, and others to collect cultural knowledge
about the syndromes from various different sources, such as self-reports,
narratives, medical journals, tools and skills of healers, etc. Conversely, it
does notmake much sense to pay attention to the particularities of the physi-
cal manifestations of the cultural homologues, as the chances are that there
will not be much projectability at the physical level of the kind. Increasingly,
the cultural content in question is inferred from texts disseminated on the
Internet. So social scientists have yet another physical realization of the rele-
vant content of a cultural homologue—but by all means not one that repla-
ces all others.
So I want to suggest that what unites such diverse things as religious prac-
tices, political ideologies, culinary arts, and musical genres is that new
instances (of information and practical know-how) tend to be reproduced
by various different physical means. Yet the historical-reproductive lineage
in each case also grounds the assumption of multiply projectable content
across an historical trajectory. It is worth stressing that ultimately, however,
the empirical generalizations associated with such multiply realized cultural
homologues will only ever be ‘local’ in character, precisely because the kinds
are underwritten by a particular spatial-temporal pattern of transmission.
This means that the kind in question is useful only when its projections are
applied to the very same culture that is responsible for reproducing the con-
tent. We should, for example, only expect that information about extremist
right-wing ideologies supports projections to the behaviour of individuals
who adhere to and stand as models for this movement, and we should only
expect information about Dadaism to generate projections about the artists,
critics, and appreciators of the movement. This is, however, not the same as
these projectable properties being necessary or analytic features of the cul-
tural kind in question. The projectable properties are synthetic features of
the kind and they can undergo change without the identity of the kind neces-
sarily being threatened.
Even some of the central information attached to the cultural homology is
capable of changing over time and also of varying between different histori-
cal branches. Hence, the details about the degree of reproductive continuity
and the branching of lineages may imply some adjustments with respect to
what kinds we intuitively pick out as relevant for the special sciences. Take
Buddhism.13 According to Buddhist scholar Cathy Cantwell [2010], there is a
commitment amongst all Buddhist traditions to the three Jewels (the Bud-
dha, the Dharma, and the Sangha), the particular initiation rite Going for the
Refuge, as well as a few other ethical, ritual, and meditative practices. Still,
she claims that there are probably many more features that vary between dif-
ferent Buddhist traditions than are shared amongst them, with the diversity
in Buddhist traditions representing ‘different historical trajectories of
13 I thank an anonymous referee for raising this important issue and for the instructive example of Buddhism.
504 Marion Godman
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [C
am
br
idg
e U
niv
ers
ity
 L
ibr
ary
] a
t 0
4:5
7 0
7 A
ug
us
t 2
01
5 
separate lines of descent’ [2010: 4]. Hence, although all branches of Bud-
dhism share common ancestry, Buddhism per se might not be that induc-
tively fecund because the different traditions have retained in common only
a small proportion of the original features.
Homology thinking in this domain also gives us some guidance as to the
principles for projectability.14 We can think of Buddhism as parallel to the
case of primates. There are, of course, some central characteristics shared by
all primates in terms of morphology and behavior, but individual primate
species (e.g. lemurs, orangutans, hominids) are each bound to represent
much more inductively fecund kinds for primatologists. As in the case of
biological evolution, we should expect there to be more reproductive fidelity,
and hence an increased multiple projectability, the more spatially-tempo-
rally proximate the instances are in the cultural evolutionary tree. This
means that there will typically be a trade-off between scope of generaliza-
tions, on the one hand, and inductive fecundity on the other, such that typi-
cally with cultural homologues increased scope (i.e. the generalizations
govern more instances) comes at the expense of fecundity. For the case of
Buddhism, this means that we should expect East Asian Buddhism (mostly
Mahayana tradition) to be more inductively fecund but less global than
Buddhism, but also less fecund and more global than a tradition like the
Soto Zen variety (introduced around the 12th century in China and Japan).
Indeed, anthropological research on Buddhism tends to bear out these
expectations.15
Thus, homology thinking in the domain of culture has the capacity to
guide our expectations about the scope of our generalizations and how
inductively fecund our kind might be. Attention to the actual historical
details can also open up to revising some intuitive projectability judgments.
So far, the virtues are in parallel with biological homologues, but in contrast
to them cultural homologues have a multiple projectability that is neither
weakened nor strengthened when we know that different physical kinds
have been used to realize the relevant projectable content. The nature of
physical realization simply does not matter in terms of cultural
projectability.
Some remarks of clarification about the proposal are due before I con-
clude. First, I am not claiming that all beliefs and behaviour are reproduced
by means of social learning. I take it that some types of beliefs, for example,
are more plausibly understood as a product of natural selection or individ-
ual learning. I rather doubt that single beliefs can carry the rich amount of
content requisite for being thought of as kinds; but if they do, it is due to
their biological transmission rather than to cultural transmission. Whether
in fact such kinds of belief (or behaviour, etc.) would also be multiply real-
ized would require a different argument entirely, since mine has hinged on
how social reproduction of cultural content encourages multiple realization.
In fact, my claims have not been about the nature of belief realization per se.
14 I am inclined to think that some of the same moral applies to other religions like Islam and Christianity and
their respective branches—although Buddhism also has particularly decentralized organization as compared
to them.
15 See Cantwell [2010] for references.
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Instead, I have been concerned to show that cultural kinds, whose instances
share a rich set of projectable content, can be realized in various physical
manifestations—not just in different token belief states.
Second, one might worry about whether there is a clear separation
between properties of the kind and the projected behaviour in these instan-
ces. In particular, I have allowed that the cultural content of the kind might
be represented and realized as part of human behaviour; at the same time, I
have suggested that kinds support generalizations and predictions about
behaviour that is not itself part of the kind. For this type of reason, the cul-
tural evolution theorist Alex Mesoudi [2011] has recently suggested that
behaviour should not be thought of as being part of culture information,
since if want culture to explain behaviour we should not make behaviour
part of culture. But, as Tim Lewens [2012] rightly points out in a response to
Mesoudi, it seems unfortunate to leave behaviour out of culture, as behav-
iour seems to be precisely the sort of thing that can be socially learned and
so is transmittable between individuals. Instead, Lewens suggests we should
simply specify that there is some other behaviour, which is not itself directly
culturally transmitted. A similar move seems possible here. Not all behav-
iour that is predicted as being based on a kind is itself in fact transmitted
behaviour, and so part of the kind. Returning to the example of the folk syn-
dromes: while it is quite plausible that the behaviour of seeking out help
from a faith healer when one experiences Peito aberto may itself be transmit-
ted (by means of imitation or observation), the fact that such a behaviour
only offers a temporary relief, and over time can develop into a more serious
condition, is a (putative) projection that we discover to be associated with
the cultural kind, but not one that is itself transmitted. There will probably
be some remaining vagueness about which behaviour and norms count as
being part of the kind and which do not; but in so far as one is troubled by
this, one will probably also be troubled about the boundary conditions for
many more proto-typical natural kinds where similar issues arise.
5. Conclusion
I have argued that particular kinds of cultural homologues (ideologies, folk
wisdom, religious traditions, etc.) are multiply realized. The literature on
cultural evolution and more traditional social sciences already operates
under the assumption that the content of such cultural homologues might
be represented in various physical items such as institutions, artefacts, verbal
and non-verbal behaviour. I have justified their assumption by arguing that,
in contrast to biological homologues where multiple projectability seems to
depend on the physical constraints on realization, the social learning respon-
sible for reproducing new instances of cultural homologues does not abide
by the same constraints. In fact, the beauty of the content of knowledge
being socially transmitted is that this is creative: it encourages the reproduc-
tion in whichever physical means are available in culture. Since social learn-
ing and culture thus jointly conspire to encourage the multiple realization of
content of such kinds, it makes perfect sense for social scientists to make use
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of various different physical realizations of the same content in their investi-
gations. I have also explored how homology thinking in the domain of cul-
ture gives us some guidance about the scope of generalizations, and what
degree of projectability to expect from cultural kinds.
Thus, we have arrived at a response to the dilemma where the multiple
projectability of the kind in question proceeds not via a reduction to physical
kinds, but via historical-reproductive continuity of a cultural kind. The
quest to find multiply realized kinds in the special sciences has also taken us
far afield from the usual suspects suggested by exponents of non-reductive
physicalism: e.g. ‘pain’, ‘eye’, and ‘thought’. To be clear, I am not denying
that the items that fall under such predicates may be multiply realized and
even projectable in some loose sense; it is just that they will not make the cut
in terms of multiple projectability. This also means that I doubt there will be
a science of such a domain at all—although evidently there will be a philoso-
phy, by its continuing to inspire a great deal of philosophical probing. On
that note, some will undoubtedly take issue with the scientific utility of those
cultural kinds that I have proposed as a solution to the dilemma, because
they have additional requirements for either scientifically useful kinds or
multiple realization (e.g., if multiple realization is taken to be a phenomenon
that is independent of historical or ancestral influence, then of course my
solution will not do). My argument here has simply been that some cultural
kinds of knowledge at least fulfil the non-trivial condition of scientific utility
in terms of supporting multiple generalizations and predictions. Kinds are
thus not reducible to physical kinds across the board, and culture makes
physicalism a much less dreary ontological thesis.16
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